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Abstract. The paper discusses Raymond Boudon’s theory of ordinary rationality as 
well as his assessment of the so-called “analytical sociology”. On the irst point, the 
paper argues that, in order to combine the realism of an unconstrained conception 
of rationality with the ex-ante facto predictive power of the narrow version of ratio-
nal  choice  theory, we  should better understand  the  relation between potentially 
triggering events and the actor’s “reasons”. Heuristics, social identity, and emotions 
are regarded as good candidates to advance in that direction. On the second point, 
the  paper  recalls  some  factual  elements  suggesting  that  Boudon’s  assessment  of 
analytical sociology is excessively severe and explains why some analytical sociolo-
gists are right in devoting especial attention to computational modelling. 
Keywords :  rationality, heuristics,  social  identity, emotions, analytical  sociology, agent-
based simulation.
Résumé. L’article  discute  la  théorie  de  la  rationalité  ordinaire  défendue  par 
Raymond Boudon ainsi que son évaluation de la sociologie dite « analytique ». Sur le 
premier point, l’article suggère que la littérature sur les heuristiques, l’identité sociale 
et  les émotions peut aider à construire une théorie de  l’action rationnelle élargie 
qui ne perde pas le pouvoir prédictif ex-ante facto propre à la théorie restreinte du 
choix rational. Sur le second point, l’article suggère que Raymond Boudon porte un 
jugement excessivement sévère sur  la  sociologie analytique et explique pourquoi 
certains sociologues analytiques ont des raisons fortes d’attribuer autant d’impor-
tance à la simulation informatique à base d’agents.
Mots-clés :  rationalité,  heuristiques,  identité  sociale,  émotions,  sociologie  analytique, 
simulation multi-agents.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most important indings in the contemporary philosophy of social 
sciences is that the materially constrained pursuit of single-minded self-interests 
is far from being the only way in which human rationality, hence rational action, 
can be conceived (see Searle, 2001). In social sciences, this fact is well relected 
by the plurality of forms that, despite its apparently unifying label, the theory 
of rational choice has assumed over the years (Goldthorpe, 1998). This hetero-
geneity expresses a progressive shift from the narrow to the broad conceptions 
of rational action. According to the latter, all kinds of desires and constraints 
are admitted, full information is no longer assumed, and actors’ subjectivity in 
constraint perception is crucial (Opp, 1999). This move away from the narrow 
versions of rational action theory is partly due to the lack of empirical support for 
its core micro-level assumptions – where experimental psychology (Shair and 
LeBoeuf, 2002) and behavioral economics (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004) 
played the crucial role – and partly to its explanatory failures (Ostrom, 1998).
However, the dichotomous distinction between narrow and broad versions 
of rational action theories tends to hide an important fact: that broad versions 
are not all equally broad. In this regard, the most noticeable change over the 
last two decades has been the difusion of an extreme variant of broad rational 
choice theory in which actors’ rationality is equated to having subjectively well-
founded “reasons”. Rational action thus basically amounts to “reasoned action” 
(more than to “reasonable action”: on the distinction between “rationality” 
and “reasonableness” see Beaney [2001]).
In economics, this point of view is endorsed by Sen (2009, p. 180), who 
expresses it as follows: “Rationality of choice, in this view, is primarily a matter 
of basing our choices – explicitly or by implication – on reasoning that we can 
relectively sustain if we subject them to critical scrutiny”. Reason sustainabi-
lity is not only a matter of “self-scrutiny”, Sen (2009, p. 196) adds, but also of 
“defensibility in reasoning with others” – here, Sen (2009, p. 44-46) refers back 
to Smith’s metaphor of the “impartial spectator”. Similar views can be found in 
political philosophy (see Rawls, 2003; Young, 2005; and Pizzorno, 2007, p. 123).
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In sociology, over the last two decades or so, Raymond Boudon has been 
among the scholars who have taken this open conception of rationality as a set of 
well-grounded subjective reasons to its furthest extent (see Boudon 1989, 1993, 
1996, 1998a, 2003, and 2011). His plea for a “reason with a small r” is based on 
the conviction that every other deinition of rationality would be insuicient 
fully to account for the variety of ways in which human behaviour can be 
called “rational” (see Boudon, 1994, ch. 9). Similarly to Sen (2009, p. 191-193), 
Boudon’s extreme extension of the concept of rationality is strictly related to 
his intention rationally to explain not only individuals’ choices of means but 
also their choices of ends (see Boudon, 2001).
As I read it, Boudon’s “‘Analytical sociology’ and the explanation of beliefs” 
(see, in this issue, p. 7-34) is the most remarkable synthesis of his theory of 
rational action. To the best of my knowledge, this paper also contains his 
irst explicit assessment of an approach to sociological theory that, over the 
last ten years or so, has received considerable attention around the world, i.e. 
so-called “analytical sociology”.
I have two purposes in what follows. First, I intend to discuss what seems to 
me the crucial di culty with a conception of rational action that equates “ratio-
nality” with “reasons”. On this view, indeed, one can no longer beneit from 
the “predictive device” (Sen, 2009, p. 175, p. 183) contained in the narrower 
conception that frames rationality in terms of instrumental rationality. The 
line of reasoning that I shall seek to defend is that, in order to combine the 
realism of an unconstrained conception of rationality with the deductive power 
of the narrow version of rational choice theory, a possible solution is to look for 
regularities in the relation between potentially triggering events and the actor’s 
“reasons”. In particular, I shall consider heuristics, social identity, and emotions 
as explanatory factors which should be more systematically analysed to ind 
such regularities. I regard this line of reasoning as one possible starting point, 
but not as the full answer, which would be beyond the scope of this paper. My 
second goal is even more modest. I intend only to recall some factual elements 
suggesting that Boudon’s assessment of analytical sociology is excessively severe. 
In particular, I shall explain why computational modeling, to which analytical 
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sociologists devote especial attention, is a central resource with which to test 
theoretical explanations referring to complex systems of individuals’ reasons.
The paper is organized as follows. First, I discuss the main di culty with 
an unconstrained conception of rationality à la Boudon; second, I analyze this 
conception of rational action in the light of important contributions on “heuris-
tics”, on “social identity, and on “emotions” in psychology, in economics, and 
in political science. Finally, I discuss Boudon’s assessment of analytical sociology. 
1. WHAT WE CAN (NOT) DO WITH 
BOUDON’S THEORY OF ORDINARY RATIONALITY
“‘Analytical sociology’ and the explanation of beliefs” (see p. 7-34, in this 
issue) contains a clear exposition of what Boudon now calls a “theory of ordi-
nary rationality” (Boudon [1989] irst adopted the label of “subjective rationa-
lity”, and then that of “cognitive rationality”: see, for instance, Boudon, 1996). 
The theory relies on the “cognitive equilibrium principle” according to which 
one must examine actors’ reasons to ind the proximate causes of their choices 
– in Boudon’s words, “people believe that X is true, acceptable, good, legiti-
mate, etc. as soon as they have the feeling that X rests upon a set of acceptable 
reasons” (“‘Analytical sociology’...”, p. 18 – note the similarity between this 
statement and Sen’s deinition of rational action quoted in the introduction).
Thus, the distinctiveness of Boudon’s theory of rational action is that 
actors’ reasons are completely unrestricted in the sense that no speciic class 
of reasons is given explanatory priority. The rhetoric of cost-beneit calculation 
disappears behind the variety of arguments that actors can endorse and publi-
cly defend to sustain the beliefs that motivate them to act. In the paper under 
discussion, Boudon demonstrates that this open conception of actors’ rationa-
lity makes it possible to explain much more social regularity than allowed by 
the narrow version of the rational choice theory. In particular, he argues, by 
extending the set of acceptable reasons, it is possible to explain not only the 
choice of means but also the choice of ends. In this way, sociology can explain 
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the genesis of complex sets of human values like individuals’ feelings of justice 
(on this point, see, in particular, Boudon and Betton, 1999).
This achievement comes with a cost, however. To restrict actors’ motivations 
to a speciic class of reasons – instrumental reasons, in the case of the narrow 
variants of the rational choice theory – makes it possible to form expectations 
on the micro-behaviours and their macroscopic consequences that are most 
likely to appear, given a certain set of constraints. A given empirical observation 
can thus be compared with a clear benchmark that is formulated before the 
observation is made. As acknowledged by Sen (2009, p. 175 and p. 183), who, as 
we have seen, endorses a very open conception of rational action, the capacity 
to igure out a single outcome ex-ante facto is lost when actors’ rationality is given 
a completely unconstrained form. On this view, the expression “rational action 
theory” itself is inappropriate. Strictly speaking, indeed, there is no theory, but 
rather a single framework in which every sort of reason-based explanation – i.e. 
an explanation focusing on the system of arguments that a given set of actors 
endorse to act in the way that they act – can be conceived.
The loss of the “predictive device”, to use Sen’s expression, afecting the 
conception of human rationality as a complex set of subjectively well-groun-
ded reasons should be carefully distinguished from two related but analyti-
cally distinct objections usually brought against the broad versions of ratio-
nal choice theory: namely their lack of deductive power, and the danger of 
adhocness to which they are exposed. 
As correctly pointed out by Boudon (1998b, p. 195) himself, the deductive 
power of a theory involving individuals’ reasons does not depend “on the nature 
of reasons mobilized in a model”. Given a set of postulated “reasons”, in fact, it is 
possible to form expectations on what behaviour is likely to appear. As no explana-
tory primacy is given to a speciic set of “reasons”, however, the deductive power 
only exists once the set of reasons have been postulated. But how could one achieve 
such a system of reasons? This question leads directly to the adhocness objection that 
an unrestricted conception of human rationality increases the probability that the 
set of hypothesized reasons will continue to be re-adjusted until it is possible to 
demonstrate that a given macroscopic regularity in fact derives from a population 
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of actors acting in a rational way (Pizzorno, 2007, p. 65-66). As discussed at length 
by Opp (1999), however, this danger can be powerfully counteracted by the use 
of empirical data to assess the extent to which the hypothesized set of reasons is 
tenable. More speciically, the empirical solution says that, given a certain indivi-
dual behaviour and a set of macroscopic consequences, once the set of individual 
reasons leading to this behaviour has been formulated, one must test whether the 
reasons postulated are empirically tenable. If not, one should revise the protocol 
of data collection and / or modify the set of hypothesized reasons. 
The “empirical argument” thus amounts to an iterative procedure of post hoc 
theory testing which tends to be case-oriented. It only suggests that theories 
built on a very open conception of rational action can be falsiied, but it does 
not help to remedy the problem of the reduced predictive power of these 
theories. In other words, Opp’s empirical approach does not solve the problem 
of the variety of predictions than can be made on the basis of a conception of 
rational action that equates “rationality” and “reasonableness” – a problem that 
Boudon himself has acknowledged elsewhere (1998b, p. 195)1.
Would it be possible to go beyond the empirical approach? In particular, is 
there any way to combine an open conception of rationality with the predictive 
power of the narrow versions of the rational choice theory? My answer is that 
we may eventually achieve this result by identifying some mechanisms that tend 
systematically to trigger certain set of reasons. In this case, we would have access 
to a set of regularities that enable us to formulate ex-ante facto clear expectations 
on what micro- and macro-level outcomes are more likely to be observed2.
1  Boudon’s reply  is  that “the reconstruction of reasons  is a  theory and that, as soon as the 
elements of a theory are acceptable, because they consist of empirical data and acceptable 
laws, the challenge is to ind another theory that would be better in some respect […] If you 
do not like the latter, the challenge is this: ind a better theory. We can never prove that a 
theory is true, only that one theory is better than another” (personal communication from 
Boudon’s after he had read a irst draft of the present paper). But this does not help solve the 
problem. Like Opp’s empirical argument, this one only suggests that reason-based theories 
can be falsiied. It does not address the issue of their capacity to point out ex-ante facto what 
system of reasons is likely to appear under certain circumstances, which is what one needs 
to produce ex-ante facto testable propositions.
2  The “empirical approach” can, of course, contribute to this result. In the long run, indeed, if 
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2. THREE CLASSES OF “REASON TRIGGERS”
I propose to deine a “reason trigger” as a structural or individual-level 
factor that increases the probability that a speciic set of reasons will arise in 
the actor’s mind. I focus here on three broad class of reason triggers that may 
help in inding regularity in the individuals’ belief formation process, namely 
(i) “cognitive and social heuristics”; (ii) human invariants; (iii) “emotions”. For 
each of these factors, I will also suggest that, while Boudon has never explicitly 
analyzed them in depth, none of them is in contradiction with his analysis of 
how reasons form in actors’ minds.
2.1. REASON-BASED EXPLANATIONS AND “HEURISTICS”
Building on Simon’s concepts of “bounded rationality” and of “heuris-
tic search” (see, respectively, Simon, 1979; and Newell et. al. 1958), a large 
body of psychological literature has developed on “heuristics”, i.e. cognitive 
shortcuts adopted by actors when they have to decide and solve problems 
(see Goldstein, 2009). In economics, this concept was used by Kahneman and 
Twersky to demonstrate that actors’ reasoning is variously “biased” and that it 
does not conform with the way in which the narrow version of rational choice 
theory frames human decision-making (for an overview see Kahneman, 2003).
Readers who are familiar with Boudon’s work may be surprised by my refe-
rence to this literature. In efect, Boudon has repeatedly criticized Kahneman 
and Twersky for treating “cognitive biases” as black boxes (see, for instance, 
Boudon, 1998b, p.180; 2004, p.186). Whilst one may agree that many of the 
“frames”, “scripts”, or “biases” mobilized in cognitive psychology and in 
economics are nothing more than labels – which is sometimes admitted even 
in the behavioral economics (see, for instance, Frederick et al., 2002, on the 
concept of “inter-temporal discount rate”) – the so-called “fast-and-frugal 
heuristic” research program (Gigerenzer, 2008) studies “heuristics” in a far 
it is applied systematically, one of its by-products may be the discovery of regularities in the 
connection between certain incentive structures and speciic sets of actors’ reasons. These 
regularities may  then  be  incorporated  into  reason-based  theories  à la  Boudon,  thereby 
increasing their predictive capacity.
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less black-box fashion and explicitly aims to go beyond the concept of “cogni-
tive biases” as conceived by Kahneman and Twersky.
Whilst, to the best of my knowledge, Boudon and Gigerenzer do not cite 
each other, their conceptions of human rationality are in fact strikingly similar. 
First of all, Gigerenzer (2008, p. 7) makes exactly the same criticism as Boudon 
of Kahneman’s “heuristic-and-biases program”. He maintains that “heuristics” 
are not directly and explicitly modeled in this research tradition, so that they 
end up with “mere verbal labels”. Moreover, like Boudon, Gigerenzer argues that 
Kahneman and Twersky in fact adhere to the standard rational choice approach 
because they still assume that actors’ rationality should comply with logic- and 
probability-based rules. According to Gigerenzer, it is instead the structure of 
the information contained in the environment in which actors are embedded 
that generates what is rational for them. He calls this conception of rationality 
“ecological rationality” (in economics, see Smith, 2008, p. 36, p. 151 and p. 168).
This largely overlaps with Boudon’s frame of rational action as “reason-
grounded action”. In the paper under discussion, for instance, Boudon states 
that, in order to understand actors’ reasons, “the observer should be aware of 
the relevant features of the social and cognitive context in which the indivi-
dual is embedded.” (“‘Analytical sociology’...”, p. 16). Thus, according to him, 
magical rituals should be interpreted as perfectly rational from the point of 
view of those individuals who are ignorant of biological, chemical and physical 
mechanisms that are instead known by many contemporary observers. In the 
two cases, the structure of the information is simply diferent.
Given the strong similarity between Boudon’s “ordinary rationality” and 
Gigerenzer’s “ecological rationality”, what should we expect to gain from a more 
systematic integration between the two theoretical perspectives? My argument is 
that the experimental evidence accumulated within the “fast-and-frugal heuris-
tic” (for an overview see Gigerenzer et al., 2011) provides useful empirical mate-
rial with which to ind regularities between the environment in which actors 
are embedded and the system of reasons that they tend to develop. We may 
discover, for instance, that, when information is highly skewed so that certain 
outcomes are rare, actors have good reasons to believe that they perform (or can 
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avoid risk) better than they do in reality. Systematic links of this kind among 
given informational structures, beliefs, and certain mental shortcuts may help 
in building reason-based explanations that do not rely on a posteriori operations of 
reason reconstruction, thereby helping us to specify in advance the micro-level 
behaviour and its macroscopic consequences that are most likely to be observed.
2.2. REASON-BASED EXPLANATIONS AND “SOCIAL IDENTITY”
The second class of reason triggers that might be fruitfully incorporated 
into reason-based explanations are “human invariants”, i.e., as I conceive them 
here, behavioral, cognitive or emotional patterns common to all human beings 
regardless of the culture in which they live.
At irst sight, similarly to the concepts of “heuristics” and biases”, that of 
“human invariant” may seem incompatible with Boudon’s theoretical framework. 
In efect, the French sociologist has never concealed his distaste for “dispositional 
variables”, which, in the paper under discussion, he deines as “conjectural causes 
operating in the backs of [the actors’] mind”(“‘Analytical sociology’...”, p. 17). On 
the other hand, however, in his inal comment on Durkheim’s analysis of magi-
cal rituals, he judges Durkheim’s explanation convincing because it introduces 
“either empirical statements [...] or psychological uncontroversial laws, as ‘in 
general people want to survive’” (ibid., p. 22). Boudon is thus implicitly admitting 
that “dispositional variables” are legitimate explanatory factors as long as we can 
demonstrate that these dispositions correspond to well-deined basic individual 
needs or desires (see also Elster, 2011, p. 61).
This is an extremely important point because it opens rational action theory 
in sociology to research in anthropology (see, for instance, Brown, 1991, 1999, 
2004), in evolutionary psychology (see Pinker, 2002) and, partly, in behavioral 
economics (see, for instance, Henrich et al., 2001; Gächter and Herrmann, 2009) 
intended to establish the existence of individual invariants empirically. This 
literature can be of beneit to sociologists defending a conception of human 
rationality which equates rationality and “reason-grounded action” in that it 
can provide insights on universal psychological motivations that tend regularly 
to activate speciic set of reasons.
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Among basic individual needs, an individual’s desire to possess and to 
defend a well-deined social identity seems especially important for sociological 
analysis. In social psychology, it is commonplace to consider the need for social 
belonging as a fundamental motivation (see, for instance, Fiske, 2011, p. 116). 
Pizzorno’s and Akerlof’s conceptualizations of social identity are two interes-
ting starting points from which to assess the fruitfulness of a closer integration 
between reason-based explanation à la Boudon and identity-based explanations. 
In efect, Pizzorno overtly builds his theoretical proposal against the theory 
of rational choice and methodological individualism, whereas Akerlof aims to 
extend the standard model of the actor in mainstream economics3.
Pizzorno’s (1986, p. 366-372) thesis is that social action can be framed in 
terms of rational action provided we accept that rationality needs identity. He 
explains the source of this link as follows. When an actor is choosing between, 
say, X and Y, at time t, according to rational action theory, he should be able 
to evaluate the expected beneits of the two alternatives at time t+n. However, 
Pizzorno argues, in order for this evaluation to be possible, the actor’s identity 
should be stable over time. If not, the expected future beneits of X and of Y 
cannot be really evaluated and compared because the actor does not know what 
his point of view on X and on Y will be at time t+n. Thus, without inter-temporal 
identity stability, he argues, rational action is impossible. Pizzorno’s proposal is 
that social recognition, hence the social circles that provide it, should be conside-
red as identity “stabilizers”. That is why the actor’s logic, according to Pizzorno, 
3  Within  the micro-foundationist  tradition,  Little  (1998,  ch. 6)  has  argued  that  there  is  no 
incompatibility  in  principle  between  identity-  and  reason-based  theories.  Broad  rational-
choice theorists have explicitly attempted to  incorporate  identity  into the rational-choice 
framework. Some have done so by introducing the idea that actors are animated by a mul-
tiplicity of selves, the objective of this hypothesis being to account for some violations of the 
predictions that would ensue from the standard rational-theory, like the so-called weakness 
of will phenomenon (see, for instance, Elster, 1985, and Coleman, 1990, ch. 19). Others have 
tried  to  incorporate  identity-based preferences  into  rational  choice  theory by  conceiving 
“social identity” as a complex set of beliefs about oneself and about the group to which one 
thinks/wants to belong (see Aguiar and Francisco, 2009). Here my point of view is different, 
in that, on the one hand,  I am not mobilizing social  identity to remedy some explanatory 
failures of the narrow version of the rational choice theory, and, on the other hand, I consider 
the desire-component of social identity more than its belief-component.
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is driven more by the quest for sources of social recognition than by self-interest 
(see Aguiar and Francisco [2002] for a criticism of Pizzorno’s argument).
Pizzorno’s and Boudon’s analytical framework are less distant that might 
seem. In the paper under discussion, Boudon states that actors can believe 
that the reasons that they endorse to act in the way that they act are strong 
only if they also believe that these reasons can in principle be shared by other 
actors. This is the concept of reason trans-subjectivity (see “‘Analytical socio-
logy’...”, p. 18). Pizzorno’s idea of “recognition circles” implies a similar 
notion: the actor needs others with similar views in order to be reassured 
about his identity, which is what makes belief and reason formation possible. 
In both cases, it is postulated that actors need to search for potential sources 
of (more or less) local social consensus.
A similar concern for social conformism is behind Akerlof’s endeavour to 
devise a new approach in economics called “identity economics” (see Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2001). The basic assumption here is that beliefs about oneself 
(identity), beliefs about expected behaviors (normative beliefs, in Boudon’s 
terminology) as a function of this identity, and choices are closely interrelated. 
On this basis, Akerlof and Kranton build an analytical framework that can be 
summarized as follows: a) actors belong to social categories; b) social cate-
gories convey beliefs about the self (actors’ identity); c) social categories are 
also associated with norms about the prevailing behavior within the category; 
d) actors’ utility increases/decreases if they conform with / violate these norms 
(ibid., p. 14 and chap. 3). Conformism assures social belonging (ibid., p. 22).
Despite the diferent pathways that Pizzorno and Akerlof follow to plead for 
an integration of identity concerns into rational action theory, both of them esta-
blishes a link among social belonging, social identity and actors’ beliefs. Again, 
my argument is that this link can help in building reason-based explanations 
that lead to ine-grained predictions ex-ante facto. For instance, when actors are 
deeply concerned to secure their social identity, one may expect that, in order to 
reinforce their participation in a social group, they will be more likely to accept 
material and psychological costs so that collective action (see Willer, 2009) or 
even extreme choices like terrorist attacks (see Tosini, 2011) become possible. 
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When such concerns for social identity and status drive actor’s behaviour, we 
can also expect them to express diferent convictions in diferent social circles, 
to change their minds as the networks to which they belong change, or publicly 
to express opinions that they do not endorse in private – the so-called “unpopu-
lar norms” (see Bicchieri, 2006, ch. 5; Centola, Willer, and Macy, 2005; Willer, 
Kuwabara, and Macy, 2009). Within this analytical framework that conceives 
the need for social identity as a fundamental human motivation, preference 
inconsistency can thus be anticipated and explained without introducing 
dubious hypotheses like that of a fragmentation of the actor’s self.
2.3. REASON-BASED EXPLANATIONS AND “EMOTIONS”
Emotions are the last reason trigger that I shall briely discuss as a basic 
micro-level element that might help to increase the predictive power of theo-
ries based on a conception of rational action as “reason-grounded action”4. 
In the paper under discussion, Boudon does not address the place of 
emotions in the explanation of social action. Elsewhere, however, he explicitly 
admits that actors’ emotions and actors’ reasons are closely related, with the 
causality going in both directions, i.e. from actors’ beliefs to actors’ emotions 
and the reverse (see, for instance, Boudon, 2003b, p. 150-151). 
This is important because, as pointed out by Frijda et al. (2000), much 
research has been conducted to understand how emotions are triggered by the 
way in which actors perceive external events (see, for instance, Scherer, 2011). 
By contrast, “oddly”, say Frijda et al. (2000, p. 1), the causal direction going 
from actors’ emotions to actors’ beliefs “has received scant attention”. When 
this is the case, they remark, “the emphasis has been on the assumption that 
the former [emotions] distort the latter [beliefs]” (ibid., p. 2).
4  Stets and Turner (2006) provide a thorough overview of the variety of theoretical perspec-
tives on emotions in sociology. By contrast, the empirical description of emotions is only in 
its early stages in sociology. As remarked by Golder and Macy (2011), large-scale web-based 
data might help improve this situation.
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Elster is a good example of this asymmetry within the philosophy of 
social science and sociology. He has focused closely on the efect that actors’ 
cognitions (or perceptions) have on actors’ emotions (for a recent overview 
see Elster, 2011). In particular, he has carefully studied, for each emotion, the 
action tendency that this emotion is likely to trigger once it has been activated 
by a given belief. As regards the causal link from emotion to beliefs, howe-
ver, Elster’s (2009) analysis only focuses on the negative consequences that 
emotions can have on beliefs by triggering under-investment in information 
(urgency) or under-estimation of the long-term consequences of action (impa-
tience). The results are, respectively, low-quality and biased beliefs.
To deepen our understanding of emotions as “reason triggers”, the “posi-
tive” role that emotion plays in belief formation should be analyzed more 
systematically. That actors’ emotions do not necessarily distort cognitions is 
stressed by Scherer, for instance, who suggests that emotions can be rational 
in the sense that they can help actors to reach their goals (functional rationa-
lity), to make correct inferences (intellectual rationality), and to be accepted by 
others as persons that react in the right way (reasonable or consensual ratio-
nality). An extreme empirical example of the not-necessarily-biasing efect of 
actors’ emotions on their beliefs is that of depressive people, who tend to assess 
the reality more realistically than optimistic persons (see Scherer, 2011, p. 340). 
Similarly, it is often observed that fear or anxiety may induce actors to invest in 
information search in order to clarify their perception of what political parties 
ofer, thereby acquiring beliefs more accurate than would be possible in the 
absence of such emotions (see, Jaspers, 2011)5.
Among the variety of emotions that can act as “reason triggers”, I regard inte-
raction-comparison-based emotions as especially important. These are emotions, 
like envy, jealousy, indignation, humiliation, shame or resentment, that tend to 
be triggered by the comparisons that actors make within the dyadic interactions 
5  The emotion-to-cognition and the cognition-to-emotion patterns can co-exist. The simplest 
example is a dissonance-reduction-based mechanism of belief change where two (or more) 
beliefs that are discrepant generate negative feelings which induce the actor to change one 
(or more) of his initial beliefs (see, for instance, Harmon-Jones, 2000).
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in which they are embedded. Social networks are a fundamental part of social 
life, and actors perform every sort of social comparison within these networks. 
Interaction-comparison-based emotions are thus likely to be ubiquitous, and they 
may lie at the origin of many of the beliefs that populate actors’ minds6.
Recent research in social psychology suggests that this is a fruitful idea. 
Fiske (2011) builds on an impressive amount of empirical studies to demons-
trate that social comparisons tend to generate speciic emotions that in turn 
tend to generate speciic beliefs. In particular, she shows that two basic patterns 
are especially frequent. On the one hand, downward comparisons tend to 
trigger disgust and scorn, emotions that tend to induce actors to believe that 
people below them are less warm, less familiar, less competent, less articu-
late, less intelligent, and, in short, less typically human. On the other hand, 
upward comparisons tend to trigger envy and resentment, emotions that tend 
to induce actors to believe that people above them forgo their humanity to 
get ahead, that they are cold and calculating, even though they are competent. 
Coldness and competence tend to trigger the belief that wealthy people are 
engaged in a conspiracy and, ultimately, a threat to “us”.
This is precisely the kind of evidence that we need to increase the predic-
tive capacity of an approach equating rational action with “reason-grounded 
action”. If we know that upward social comparison, for instance, tends to trig-
ger speciic emotions (like envy) with speciic objects (like wealthy people), 
then we may expect to ind that speciic sets of reasons are also triggered in 
actors’ minds. Members of lower and middle social groups may be more likely 
to think that the members of upper groups do not deserve what they have 
and / or that they have obtained what they have by unfair or corrupt means. 
As a consequence, they may also be more likely to believe that the economic 
organization that supports those groups should be changed. A reason-based 
6  Elster  (1999, p. 141-142; 2007, p. 58) distinguishes between comparison-based emotions, 
like envy, and interaction-based emotions like resentment. In order to draw attention to 
the fact that these emotions are often a by-product of the social comparisons driven by 
dyadic  links between actors,  I propose the hybrid conceptual category of “comparison-
interaction-based emotions”.
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theory incorporating such emotion-belief linkages might thus be better able to 
predict ex-ante facto single outcomes at macroscopic level, like waves of anti- or 
pro-capitalist attitudes (see Jaspers 2011, for a plea for emotions to be included 
in the analysis of social movements).
2.4. THE ARGUMENT IN A NUTSHELL  
AND BOUDON’S EXPECTED REPLY
The argument that I have outlined so far is that an extremely open rational 
action theory conceiving actors’ rationality as a bundle of subjectively well-
founded reasons can proit from stronger connections with three research 
areas: 1) the “new” literature in cognitive psychology about mental and social 
shortcuts, i.e. “heuristics”; 2) the literature in anthropology and in evolutionary 
psychology about basic and culturally invariant psychological needs; 3) the 
literature in cognitive psychology on emotions.
When “heuristics”, “social identity”, and “emotions” are considered as 
“reason triggers”, the beneit that one may expect from integrating them into 
a reason-based theoretical perspective in which actors’ rationality is uncons-
trained concerns the increase in the predictive capacity of this perspective. 
The more we know about the regular linkages between the structures of infor-
mation in which the actors are embedded and their beliefs, among actors’ 
networks, their social identities and their beliefs, and between actors’ emotions 
and actors’ beliefs, the more, it seems to me, we should be able to igure out 
a priori the micro- and macro-level outcomes observable under given social 
circumstances. In this way, we may eventually combine the realism of an open 
conception of rational action with the “predictive device”, to use Sen’s expres-
sion, contained in the narrower versions of the rational choice theory.
Boudon’s reaction to the line of reasoning proposed would probably be that 
integrating cognitive-, identity-, and emotion-based mechanisms into a subjec-
tive conceptions of human rationality would expose sociologists to the risk of 
paying attention to unnecessary psychological details. Over the years, indeed, 
he has consistently defended the thesis that sociology should be based on a 
“conventional psychology”, that is to say, a highly abstract depiction of how 
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actors think and feel (see, for instance, Boudon, 2003c, p. 169-170; 2007, p. 44, 
footnote 1). Within the micro-foundationist tradition, among others, Coleman 
(1990, ch. 1) and Goldthorpe (1998, p. 181-182) have also made a strong case 
against the introduction of an elaborate individual psychology into an appro-
priate rational action theory for sociology. Their argument is that we do not 
need to go into much detail about actors’ psychology because the explanatory 
focus of sociology is the macroscopic consequences of individuals’ actions. The 
implicit assumption behind this argument is that, where large populations of 
actors are concerned, psychological diferences across actors cancel each other 
out, so that we are entitled to focus only on ideal-typical actors.
In my view, the analysis of “heuristics”, “social identity”, and “emotions” 
as “reason triggers” does not necessarily lead to a psychological-based theory 
of social action. My proposal certainly presupposes a stronger interaction with 
social and cognitive psychology; but what one should look for in this literature 
is a set of regularities between speciic individual-level factors and the genesis 
of certain set of reasons, rather than details about actors’ personalities and 
idiosyncrasies. That said, on a methodological level, we today have access to 
techniques that enable study of the macroscopic consequences of models of 
actors as complex as we want, so that we have fewer good reasons than in 
the past for omitting too many details at the micro-level. This is a point that I 
address in the next section. 
3. BOUDON AND ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY
As announced in the introduction, apart from arguing for a general theory 
of rational action, “‘Analytical sociology’ and the explanation of beliefs” contains 
Boudon’s irst explicit assessment of the so-called “analytical sociology”. Here it is:
I have the impression, though, that the handbooks on “analytical sociology” 
insist on secondary technical details and fail to identify clearly the common 
paradigm that underlies many illuminating sociological works, i.e. the para-
digm that I have tried to identify as grounded on three principles: methodo-
logical singularism, methodological individualism and the cognitive equilibrium principle 
(“‘Analytical sociology’...”, p. 31).
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Analytical sociology is a complex intellectual movement with respect to 
both its distant and proximate historical roots and its position within contem-
porary sociology.  In other words, the diachronic and the synchronic frontiers 
of analytical sociology are still not well-deined (see Manzo, 2010). Since Boudon 
explicitly limits his objection to the “handbooks of analytical sociology”, I shall 
restrict myself to programmatic books on analytical sociology in assessing this 
objection (namely, Hedström, 2005, and Hedström and Bearman, 2009a).
To this end it is important to give more precise deinition to what analyti-
cal sociology is. Hedström and Bearman’s (2009b, p. 16) propose the following: 
The explanatory strategy can be described as follows (see also Epstein, 2006): 
1. We start with a clearly delineated social fact that is to be explained; 
2.  We  formulate diferent hypotheses about relevant micro-level mecha-
nisms; 3. We translate the theoretical hypotheses into computational models; 
4. We simulate the models to derive the type of social facts that each micro-
level mechanism brings about; 5. We compare the social facts generated by 
each model with the actually observed outcomes. 
Although restrictive – more qualitative-oriented, yet analytically rigorous, scho-
lars would consider steps 3 and 4 unnecessary (see, for instance, Elster, 2007, p. 455) 
– this deinition is useful for discussing the two main points addressed by Boudon’s 
critical assessment of analytical sociology: the excessive importance attributed by 
analytical sociologists to techniques, and their myopia with respect to the most 
important principles that animate all scientiic sociological works.
3.1. ARE ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGISTS REALLY MYOPIC?
Let me start with the second point. Although Hedström and Bearman do 
not use the term “methodological singularism”, it seems to me that their step 1 
clearly follows this principle. In efect, Hedström and Bearman’s advice here is 
to focus on explananda whose temporal and spatial contours are clearly speciied.
Boudon’s second principle, i.e. “methodological individualism”, seems to 
me outlined in Hedström and Bearman’s step 2, i.e. “we formulate diferent 
hypotheses about relevant micro-level mechanisms.” Even more explicitly, 
they claim: “[...] all social facts, their structure and change, are in principle 
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explicable in terms of individuals, their properties, actions, and relations to 
one another” (Hedström and Bearman, 2009b, p. 8). Moreover, similarly to 
Boudon, Hedström and Bearman (idem) also attempt to avoid the reductio-
nist interpretation of this principle by remarking that “As we deine the term, 
structural individualism is a methodological doctrine [that] difers from tradi-
tional notions of methodological individualism (e.g. Elster, 1982) by emphasi-
zing the explanatory importance of relations and relational structures”.
Boudon’s last principle, i.e. the “cognitive equilibrium principle”, 
which basically states that human actions must be conceived as reason-
based, also seems to be at the core of analytical sociology. In its manifesto, 
Hedström (2005, p. 38-39) posits: “the desires, beliefs and opportunities of an 
actor are here seen as the proximate causes of the actor’s action and, he conti-
nues, “beliefs and desires are mental events that can be said to cause an action 
in the sense of providing reasons for the action”. As I stressed earlier, Boudon’s 
fundamental contribution is to demonstrate that there is no compelling justi-
ication for restricting actors’ reasons to instrumental ones. Contrary to what 
some critics of analytical sociology maintain (see Gross, 2009), a similar open 
conception of rationality as “reason-based actions” is also at the heart of analy-
tical sociology – “DBO theory makes no assumption that actors act rationally, 
however; it only assumes that they act reasonably and with intention”, states 
Hedström (2005, p. 61, emphasis added).
Thus, the analytical sociology manifestos suggest that the three metho-
dological principles which Boudon recognizes in every scientiic sociological 
analysis do not animate this perspective “implicitly”, as he claims. On the 
contrary, they are explicitly, consciously and programmatically put at the core 
of the approach – could it be otherwise, one may ask, given that Boudon is one 
of the main inspiring intellectual sources of the analytical sociology movement 
(see Hedström, 2005, p. 6-9 )7?
7  In this respect, the following coincidence is also signiicant. In the paper under discussion, 
Boudon  cites  a  recent  article  by  Pawson who,  according  to  Boudon,  has  “convincingly 
shown that the paradigm described by those three principles disentangle the meaning of 
“middle range theory” (“‘Analytical sociology’...”, p. 29). The second chapter of The Oxford 
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I would expect Boudon’s counter-objection to be that, if analytical socio-
logy consists explicitly in the three-rule paradigm that he has identiied, then 
he is fully entitled to claim that “although ‘analytical sociology’ is a new 
expression, it is actually old wine in new bottles, since it essentially revitalizes 
the principles more or less implicitly used by classical sociologists, notably by 
Weber and Durkheim” (“‘Analytical sociology’...”, p. 19).
That mechanism-based theorizing is at the core of classical sociology is a 
well-established historical fact (see, for instance, Cherkaoui, 2005, ch. 1 and 4). 
It is clearly evident to, and explicitly acknowledged by, analytical sociologists 
(see Hedström, 2005, p. 6; Hedström and Edling, 2009). It is also clear that 
contemporary analytical sociology can be traced back to research in mathe-
matical sociology, in sociological theory, and in philosophy of social sciences 
in the 1960s and 1970s (see Manzo, 2010). Moreover, it would also be easy to 
demonstrate that speciic pieces of analytical sociology are at the heart of seve-
ral strands of the theoretical and empirical literature in contemporary socio-
logy. But does this suice to deny the novelty of analytical sociology? I have 
argued elsewhere that the novelty of analytical sociology consists in its inte-
gration of epistemological, theoretical, and methodological proposals that only 
exist separately in the rest of the discipline (see Manzo, 2011). 
An example of this federative power of analytical sociology is the theory of 
action that it tries to set up. Its most distinctive feature is its attempt to endoge-
nize the proximate causes of individuals’ action, i.e. desires, beliefs, and opportu-
nities, by taking social interactions into account (see Hedström, 2005, p. 42-59). 
Theoretically, this has a notable consequence: social interactions open the theory 
of action to ego- and alter- centered mechanisms that are usually not linked to 
reason-based explanations within the micro-foundationist tradition.
Handbook of Analytical Sociology argues that “the theories found in this book are contem-
porary incarnations of Robert K. Merton’s notion of middle-range theory” (see Hedström 
and Udhen,2009, p. 25).
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Social interactions may induce actors to imitate each other, imitation 
being a heuristic-based mechanism responsible for belief and desire changes 
(see Gigerenzer, 2008, p. 31). The theory of action is thus open to the literature 
on heuristics that I mentioned earlier (see Goldstein, 2009). Social interac-
tions also trigger social comparisons which tend in turn to activate speciic 
emotions. The theory of action is thus open to the literature on emotions. We 
saw earlier that individual and social identity is strongly related to comparison 
processes that take place within dyadic interactions. Social interactions thus 
indirectly open the analysis of belief and desire formation and change to theo-
retical models of action that stress identity and social recognition more than 
individual reasons, such as Pizzorno’s framework or the recent developments 
in economics to which I referred earlier. Finally, taking interactions seriously 
into account to explain the genesis of beliefs, desires and opportunities makes 
it possible to establish theoretical and methodological bridges between action 
and network theory – something that, in the paper under discussion here, 
Boudon himself considers a desirable development.
One may retort that this ambition of analytical sociology to integrate dife-
rent strands of the literature in order to develop a more realistic theory of action 
is excessive because sociology does not have methodological tools with which 
to study the macroscopic consequences of complex sets of micro-level mecha-
nisms. As steps 3 and 4 of Hedström and Bearman’s research strategy show, 
many analytical sociologists think that simulation is a promising solution.
3.2. DO ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGISTS 
HAVE GOOD REASONS TO BE TECHNIQUE-ADDICTED?
This brings me to the second component of Boudon’s caustic comment 
on analytical sociology, i.e. “that the handbooks on ‘analytical sociology’ insist 
on secondary technical details”. My inal remarks aim to explain why a speci-
ic type of simulation method, namely agent-based modeling, can in fact be 
regarded as a crucial resource with which to move sociology towards being 
a deeper and more rigorous discipline (I note in passing that Boudon was a 
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strong advocate of formal modeling and simulation in the early stages of his 
intellectual career: see, for instance, Boudon, 1965, 1979).
What are agent-based models? The British computer scientist 
Michael Wooldridge (2009, p. 5) deines an agent as “a computer system that 
is capable of independent action on behalf of its user or owner”. A single agent 
is thus nothing more than a computational entity. “A multiagent system”, 
Wooldridge continues, “is one that consists of a number of agents, which 
interact with one another, typically by exchanging messages through some 
computer network infrastructure”.
This class of formal models is so important for social sciences because it 
is ininitely lexible. Virtually any substantive mechanisms can be represented 
and studied within the framework of agent-based modelling. At the deepest 
level, this lexibility relies on the speciic type of programming language adop-
ted to build this model, namely the so-called “object-oriented programming” 
which allows speciication of each computational entity as a set of attributes 
and rules and their arrangement into diferent relational topologies and across 
several levels of organization (see Hummon and Fararo, 1995). 
This lexibility is especially attractive for sociologists for the following 
reasons. First, agent-based modeling can represent entities and have them 
interact at any level of analysis. A computational agent need not necessarily 
represent an individual. Whatever entity we wish to represent can be program-
med. According to the attributes and the activities associated with the enti-
ties, agents can represent cells, atoms, molecules, individuals, organizations, 
groups, nations, and so forth. 
Second, agent-based modeling makes it possible to introduce as much 
heterogeneity as believed necessary for the problem at hand. Agents can be 
heterogeneous in terms of attributes and/or in terms of the values they get 
on these attributes. More radically, agents can be heterogeneous in terms of 
activities, tasks, or the behavior rules by which they are driven. This is a funda-
mental point. As Gallegati and Kirman (1999) pointed out in their critique of 
mainstream economics, agent-based modeling constitutes a robust formal tool 
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that indeed enables us to go beyond the metaphor of the “representative agent”. 
In the paper under discussion, Boudon constantly refers to ideal-typical actors. 
In reality, actors are heterogeneous in terms of beliefs and desires, and hete-
rogeneity matters in explaining macroscopic outcomes because heterogeneity 
spreads across social networks. Agent-based modeling allows us to represent 
heterogeneity and study its macroscopic efects.
Third, agent-based modeling is entirely agnostic about the logic of action 
by which agents are driven. This means that we are no longer obliged to repre-
sent actors who maximize or optimize some quantity; nor are we obliged to 
suppose that actors possess the very large amount of information needed to 
compute the future consequences of alternative choices. With respect to the 
theory of action, agent-based modeling is the domain of heuristics. Whatever 
mental or social shortcuts are assumed to be at work in the real world, we 
can design and study them by means of an agent-based computational model. 
Since the model is solved by simulation, that is to say by iterating the consti-
tutive rules of the model several times, mathematical tractability is no longer 
a constraint for the kind of actors that we want to represent. This is why some 
have argued that agent-based modeling is the right mathematics for social 
sciences (see Borrill and Tesfatsion, 2010). 
Finally, agent-based modeling is all about social interactions. Every 
network structure that we are able to imagine can be designed, and agents can 
be embedded within it so that their beliefs, desires, and opportunity can be 
seen as locally constrained and inluenced by the choices of other agents and 
by the network’s topology.
For these reasons, agent-based modeling cannot be considered a “secon-
dary technical detail”. This class of formal models makes it possible to design 
theoretical models as complex as we need them to be with respect to both 
action logic and structural / relational constraints afecting social actions. If 
we are really interested in the macroscopic consequences of a given set of 
hypothesized micro- and interaction-based mechanisms, agent-based mode-
ling is the most powerful method available today for the rigorous study of 
every substantive problem in which aggregation matters. In the late 1980s, 
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Coleman (1986, p. 1316) complained about the existence of “extraordinarily 
elaborated methods for analysis of the behavior of a set of independent entities 
(most often individuals), with little development of methods for characterizing 
systemic action resulting from the interdependent actions of members of the 
system”. This lack of methods with which to study the micro-macro transition 
is in principle solved by the use of agent-based modeling. 
The lexibility of this class of models may also have important consequences 
in resolving a fundamental di culty with the analysis of social mechanisms. 
As remarked by Elster (2011), one constantly has to deal with the problem of 
indeterminacy: on the one hand, the indeterminacy of the conditions that 
trigger a given (set of) mechanism(s); on the other, the indeterminacy of the 
resulting efect of mechanisms operating at the same time but in opposite 
directions. In both cases, agent-based modeling constitutes a powerful virtual 
laboratory in which to design triggering conditions and to determine the resul-
ting microscopic and macroscopic efects of concatenations of mechanisms.
Despite these objective advantages of agent-based modeling, to what extent 
might the importance that many analytical sociologists attribute to this method 
give rise to another form of “hard obscurantism” generating essentially only 
“science iction” (I borrow the two terms from Elster’s (2007, p. 458-465) criti-
cism of quantitative social sciences)? My answer is that this danger can be limi-
ted by giving priority to the so-called empirically-calibrated agent-based models 
(see Hedström, 2005, ch. 6), that is to say, artiicial societies in which agents’ 
attributes and behavior rules rely on empirical information provided by ethno-
graphic studies, experiments, or survey data. Although not easy, this combina-
tion is technically possible. I do believe that analytical sociology should be given 
the chance to prove that this is a research pathway that is worth exploring. 
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CONCLUSION
I have discussed an article by Boudon which I regard as important for two 
reasons. On the one hand, it is a synthetic exposition of his conception of ratio-
nal action as “reason-based action”; on the other, it is also Boudon’s irst direct 
assessment of the growing intellectual movement labeled “analytical sociology”. 
As regards the former aspect, I irst pointed out that Boudon’s conception 
of rational action is part of a more extensive shift from a narrow to a broad 
version of rational action theory. To some extent, Boudon’s theory represents 
the extreme version of this trend, in that it equates rationality to the subjec-
tively perceived reasons that an actor endorses to believe/do what he belie-
ves / does. In this respect, my argument has concerned the main problem that 
must be tackled when we assume that rational action amounts to “reason-
grounded action”, i.e. the reduced capacity to igure out ex-ante facto a single 
micro- or macro-level outcome that should be observed under certain social 
circumstances. As Boudon honestly admits, the larger the set of acceptable 
reasons, the less unique are the theory’s predictions. 
To solve this problem, I have suggested that, instead of going back to a 
narrower conception of rational action (as Abell [1992] suggested, for instance), 
we may try to accumulate regularities on “reason triggers”: that is to say, 
micro- or structural-level facts that increase the probability that speciic sets 
of reasons will appear to actors’ minds. Among possible “reason triggers”, I 
have focused on “heuristics”, “social identity”, and “emotions”. In particular, 
I have stressed that the experimental evidence accumulated within the “fast-
and-frugal heuristic” research program in cognitive psychology shows syste-
matic links among given informational structures, given beliefs, and certain 
mental shortcuts. Recent research in social psychology, political science, and 
economics on social identity conceived as a fundamental psychological need 
is of help in establishing regularities in the connection among social belon-
ging, social identity and actors’ beliefs that increase our capacity to predict 
actors’ preference inconsistencies across social circles and over time. Social 
and cognitive psychology research on the positive, not necessarily distorting, 
Revue européenne des sciences sociales 59
role of emotions in belief formation can help in detecting regularities in actors’ 
systems of reason, in particular when interaction-based social comparisons are 
at the origin of emotions like envy, jealousy, indignation, shame, or resentment. 
In regard to Boudon’s critical stance on analytical sociology, I have sought 
to show that the basic principles of this approach are identical with Boudon’s 
conception of what scientiic sociology should be. A minor disagreement 
concerns the stress that some analytical sociologists put on the technical side 
of the enterprise. On this point, my argument has been that a speciic class of 
formal models, namely agent-based computational simulations, is in fact one 
of the best resources available today for the study of theoretical models based 
on a complex form of methodological individualism. I have suggested that this 
conviction does not arise from a naïve love of technicalities, but rather from the 
close match between the theoretical requirements of this form of methodologi-
cal individualism and the structural features of the computational methodology.
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not least, I wish to express my gratitude to Adrian Belton for revising my English. 
The usual disclaimers apply.
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